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The Justifications for Nondegradation Programs in U.S. Environmental Law 
 
Robert L. Glicksman* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The international law principle of non-regression requires that existing norms or 
standards not be revised to reduce the protection of collective or individual rights.1  
Within the European Union (EU), the non-regression principle requires member states to 
ensure that setting common minimum standards in accordance with EU Directives does 
not have the effect of lowering standards in individual member states.2  EU employment 
legislation, for example, includes non-regression clauses providing that the 
implementation of an EU Directive does not justify reducing the general level of worker 
protection in the field covered by that Directive.3 
 
The concept of non-regression is not one that is familiar to environmental law in 
the United States.  Nevertheless, Congress and federal agencies have adopted programs to 
prevent degradation of existing high quality environments and to prevent revisions of 
individual emissions restrictions by making them more lenient.  The first programs are 
known as nondegradation or anti-degradation programs.  The others preclude 
“backsliding” by prohibiting slippage in performance by regulated entities complying 
with regulations that are later loosened.  The nondegradation and anti-backsliding 
programs differ from the non-regression principle in that their justifications are not rooted 
in a commitment to the protection of individual rights.  Instead, the programs are based 
on goals that include providing a safety net in the event that ambient quality-based 
environmental standards are not as protective as assumed, protecting unique landscapes 
of high recreational, cultural, or spiritual value, balancing environmental protection goals 
with efforts to promote economic growth, preventing the development of pollution 
havens, and spurring the development of more effective pollution control technology. 
 
This chapter explores the history and current status of nondegradation and anti-
backsliding programs under U.S. water and air pollution control legislation.  It describes 
the justifications for these programs that appear to have prompted Congress and the 
federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to adopt them.  It also assesses 
                                                 
* J.B. & Maurice C. Shapiro Professor of Environmental Law, The George Washington University Law 
School. 
1 Non Regression Principle Knowledge Forum,  
http://www.iucn.org/about/work/programmes/environmental_law/elp_news/elp_news_archive/?5888/NON
-REGRESSION-PRINCIPLE-KNOWLEDGE-FORUM (19.8.11).  See also Alice Donald, A Bill of Rights 
for the UK? Why the Process Matters, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 494 (2010) (“[T]he principle of non-
regression established by UN treaty bodies . . . require[es] that standards for human rights protection that 
have already been adopted should not later be undone.”). 
2 European Union Preparatory Acts, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the Right of Access to a Lawyer in Criminal Proceedings and on the Right to Communicate upon Arrest, 
EU: COM(2011) 326, Art. 14. 
3 Steve Peers, Non-regression Clauses: The Fig Leaf Has Fallen, 39 INDUSTRIAL L.J. 446 (2010).   
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alternative, rights-based justifications for nondegradation programs, that, while not 
reflected in federal environmental law in the U.S., may be supported by state 
constitutional and common law theories.  While these theories may support rights-based 
nondegradation constraints in limited contexts, they are not likely to generate a broad-
based set of nondegradation obligations that bind governments in the U.S. 
 
II. RIGHTS-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
Neither the U.S. Constitution nor federal environmental statutes recognize an 
enforceable individual right to a clean or healthy environment.  Individual state laws are 
more receptive to the creation and protection of such rights.  Some state constitutions 
recognize individual environmental rights, although those provisions may depend on 
legislative implementation.  Some state common law tort theories, which supplement 
statutory environmental programs, are also rights-based. 
 
A. Environmental Rights under Federal Law 
 
As a matter of federal law, there is no right to any particular level of 
environmental quality.  Legislators in the 1960s and 1970s introduced bills in Congress to 
provide constitutional status to environmental protection.4  The reluctance of the 
American people to alter the Constitution, the rigorous process for doing so, and 
confidence that legislation would produce the desired level of protection even without a 
constitutional amendment helped defeat those bills.5  The conviction that legislative 
protection was sufficient was not necessarily misguided, given the array of environmental 
laws Congress adopted between 1969 and 1980 and the rigor with which courts enforced 
statutes such as the National Environmental Policy Act.6  In addition, the beneficiaries of 
environmental protection rights are not the kind of minority without effective access to 
the legislative process for which constitutional protections have often been afforded.7 
 
Others pressed for judicial recognition of a constitutional right to a clean 
environment in the existing text of the Constitution, principally through the Ninth 
Amendment’s insistence that the enumeration of certain rights does not “deny or 
disparage” the recognition of other rights.8  The courts, however, were not receptive.9  
There is no prospect for the foreseeable future of embedding in the Constitution a right to 
a decent environment generally or to protection against environmental degradation. 
 
                                                 
4 See Oliver A. Houck, Foreword: The Missing Constitution, in PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW xxiii (James R. May ed., 2011). 
5 Id. at xxiv.  See also Carole L. Gallagher, The Movement to Create an Environmental Bill or Rights: 
From Earth Day, 1970 to the Present, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 107, 122-23 (1997) (arguing that 
legislators believed that federal legislation precluded the need for a constitutional amendment). 
6 Houck, supra note 4, at xxiv. 
7 See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 51 (6th ed. 2011). 
8 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.  See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 64 (2d ed. 1994). 
9 See, e.g., Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971); Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532, 535 
(S.D. Tex. 1972); Envtl. Def. Fund v. Corps of Eng’rs, 325 F. Supp. 728, 739 (E.D. Ark. 1971). 
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The federal environmental statutes also lack rights-based protections as they 
generally do not provide mechanisms to compensate injured individuals.  The provision 
that comes closest to recognizing individual environmental rights is the National 
Environmental Policy Act’s recitation “that each person should enjoy a healthful 
environment.”10  That provision, however, has been ignored by the courts and, along with 
the rest of NEPA, given no substantive content.11  Indeed, Congress considered but 
refused to enact a version of that provision that would have “recognize[d] that each 
person has a fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful environment” precisely 
because it wanted to avoid creation of a right that would lead to legal claims.12 
 
B. Environmental Rights under State Law 
 
Efforts to constitutionalize a right to environmental protection have met with 
more success in the states.  According to one account, about half of the states recognize 
environmental concern as an important policy or purport to provide a basic civil right to a 
quality environment.13  Montana’s constitution, discussed below, probably contains the 
strongest environmental provision found in any state.14  Often, however, enforcement of 
these state constitutional rights is contingent on legislative implementation.15 
 
Common law decisionmaking by state courts provides another basis for protecting 
individuals from environmental harms.  The justifications for abating and redressing 
environmental harms differ depending on the theory pursued.  Negligence liability is 
fault-based and is imposed on those whose breach of an applicable duty of care results in 
injury to the plaintiff.  Trespass is clearly rights-based, but the right protected is a 
landowner’s right to exclusive possession, not a right to a decent environment or to be 
protected against threats to one’s health.16  Many courts and scholars regard nuisance law 
as rooted in utilitarian principles that determine liability by assessing which party to a 
dispute can avoid it at the least cost.17  Others argue that private nuisance law functions to 
protect basic human rights such as health and the right to be left alone in one’s living 
                                                 
10 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (2006). 
11 See Philip Michael Ferester, Revitalizing the National Environmental Policy Act: Substantive Law 
Adaptations from NEPA’s Progeny, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 207, 208 (1992);  Lucia A. Silecchia, 
Environmental Ethics from the Perspective of NEPA and Catholic Social Teaching: Ecological Guidance 
for the Twenty-First Century, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 659, 796 (2004). 
12 Oliver A. Houck, Is that All? A Review of the National Environmental Policy Act, An Agenda for the 
Future, by Lynton Keith Caldwell, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 173, 182 (2000). 
13 James R. May & William Romanowicz, Environmental Rights in State Constitutions, in PRINCIPLES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 306 (James R. May ed., 2011).  For a complete listing of state 
constitutional provisions recognizing environmental rights, see id. at 315-21. 
14 Montana Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Montana Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236, 1248 (Mont. 1999). 
15 May & Romanowicz, supra note 13, at 313.  See, e.g., Robb v. Shockoe Slip Found., 228 Va. 678, 324 
S.E.2d 674 (1985); Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 
1973). 
16 See Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and Economics, and Natural Property 
Rights, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1379, 1419 (2010) (describing trespass as a “rights-based tort”). 
17 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (balancing gravity of the plaintiff’s harm against the utility 
of the defendant’s conduct to determine liability in a private nuisance action). 
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space.18  Private nuisance cases reflect a mix of the utilitarian and rights-based 
approaches, but in any event, protects only those with interests in land.19  Public 
nuisance, which is not linked to property ownership, is designed to protect a broader 
range of community rights to health, safety, and welfare.20 
 
Even if common law actions reflect rights-based protections, however, they are 
incapable of providing the kind of broad-based governmental duties that constitutional 
law provides.  These actions are by definition piecemeal and liability against the 
government may be impeded by sovereign immunity. 
 
III. THE ORIGINS AND CONTENT OF NONDEGRADATION AND ANTI-BACKSLIDING 
PROGRAMS FOR WATER AND AIR POLLUTION 
 
Statutory programs to prevent environmental degradation predate the adoption of 
the major pollution laws such as the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act.  Congress 
eventually endorsed these programs in both statutes, although their scope and legal 
consequences are not entirely clear, especially under the Clean Water Act.  
Environmental statutes, and regulations issued by the federal Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), also prohibit backsliding by pollution sources who have complied with 
regulatory restrictions that are later made less stringent for a larger class of sources. 
 
A. Nondegradation in U.S. Environmental Law  
 
Before the late 1960s, U.S. environmental law was largely a creature of state law.  
State pollution control programs before the adoption of the Clean Air Act in 1970 and the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act in 1972 did not include a nondegradation policy.21 
But the federal government adopted nondegradation programs for both water and air 
pollution even before Congress passed those two laws. 
 
1. Nondegradation and Water Pollution Control 
 
 Before EPA’s creation in 1970, the Department of the Interior adopted guidelines 
to implement the 1965 Water Quality Act,22 which required all states to adopt water 
quality standards consisting of use designations (such as drinking or fishing) and water 
                                                 
18 1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER 30-31 (1986) (stating that “[t]his 
group views nuisance law as protecting some version of unique human rights”). 
19 See Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in American Nuisance Law: 1850 to 1920, 
59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1226 (1986) (“Utilitarian arguments . . . still vie with arguments from individual 
right” in resolution of nuisance cases). 
20 See, e.g., Randall Abate, Public Nuisance Suits for the Climate Justice Movement: The Right Thing and 
the Right, 85 WASH. L. REV. 197, 201 (2010) (arguing that public nuisance suits can help “secure human 
rights-based relief for those disproportionately affected by climate change impacts”). 
21 N. William Hines, A Decade of Nondegradation Policy in Congress and the Courts: The Erratic Pursuit 
of Clean Air and Clean Water, 62 IOWA L. REV. 643, 654 (1977). 
22 Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965). 
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quality characteristics needed to permit those uses to occur.23  The guidelines provided 
that “[i]n no case will standards providing for less than existing water quality be 
acceptable,” and that standards provide for “[t]he maintenance and protection of quality 
and use or uses of water now of a higher quality or of a quality suitable  for present and 
potential uses.”24  Unfortunately, enforcement of the guidelines was cursory.25   
 
In 1968, Interior Secretary Stewart Udall endorsed the policy of preventing 
degradation of existing clean water resources.26  The Secretary’s policy, however, 
retreated from the absolute protection of existing water quality reflected in the 1966 
guidelines.27  It required maintenance of waters whose quality was better than established 
standards, unless a state could justify degradation based on necessary economic or social 
development.  Degradation would not be allowed, however, to interfere with or injure 
designated uses then being made or which could be made of those waters.28 
 
 Despite the weakening of the 1966 guidelines, state governors and the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce complained that a nondegradation policy would unreasonably 
restrict economic development and state enforcement of the guidelines lagged.29  By the 
time Congress adopted the modern Clean Water Act in 1972, the water quality standards 
of all fifty states nominally included versions of a nondegradation policy statement, but in 
most states, nondegradation was little more than an unimplemented objective.30 
 
 The 1972 law said nothing about nondegradation policy.  EPA, which had taken 
over control of federal water quality programs, took the position that a nondegradation 
policy was “consistent with the spirit, intent, and goals of the Act,” especially the goal of 
restoring and maintaining the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation’s 
waters.31  EPA refined the policy in 1975, creating the requirements that, with few 
changes, remain in place today.32  In 1987, Congress cryptically addressed 
                                                 
23 GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 553. 
24 Hines, supra note 21, at 658. 
25 See Mary A. Stitts, Note, The Ever-Changing Balance of Power in Interstate Water Pollution: Do 
Affected States Have Anything to Say After Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1341, 1356 
(1993). 
26 Lauren Kalisek, The Principle of Antidegradation and Its Place in Texas Water Quality Permitting, 41 
TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4 (2010).  See also Jeffrey M. Gaba, Federal Supervision of State Water Quality 
Standards Under the Clean Water Act, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1189-90 (1983) [hereinafter Gaba, Federal 
Supervision]; Michael C. Blumm & William Warnock, Roads Not Taken: EPA vs. Clean Water, 33 ENVTL. 
L. 79, 104 (2003).  
27 Hines, supra note 21, at 659. 
28 Kalisek, supra note 26, at 5-6.  See 40 Fed. Reg, 55340 (Nov. 28, 1975). 
29 Michael Snyder, Note, Nondegradation of Water Quality: The Need for Effective Action, 50 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 890, 893, 897 (1975). 
30 Hines, supra note 21, at 659-60. 
31 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).  See EPA, Questions and Answers on Antidegradation 1 (Aug. 1985) 
[hereinafter Qs & As]. 
32 40 C.F.R. § 131.12.   For discussion of the policy, see  John Harleston, What Is Antidegradation Policy: 
Does Anyone Know?, 5 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 33, 47 (1996); John L. Horwich, Water Quality Nondegradation 
in Montana: Is Any Deterioration Too Much?, 14 PUB. LAND L. REV. 145, 158-60 (1993). 
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nondegradation of water quality for the first time, providing that for waters whose quality 
exceeds levels necessary to protect the designated use, any effluent limitation based on a 
total maximum daily load33 may be revised only if the revision “is subject to and 
consistent with the anti-degradation policy established under this section.”34  The statute, 
which still governs nondegradation policy, simply incorporates by reference EPA’s prior 
administrative policy.35 
 
A state’s anti-degradation policy is part of the water quality standards it must 
adopt and enforce.36  EPA regulations currently provide that each state must adopt an 
anti-degradation policy that includes three elements.  First, existing instream water uses 
and the level of water quality necessary to protect those uses must be maintained and 
protected.  According to the Supreme Court, the CWA’s anti-degradation policy requires 
that “state standards be sufficient to maintain existing beneficial uses of navigable waters, 
preventing their further degradation.”37  Second, the state must maintain water quality 
that exceeds levels necessary to support propagation of fish and wildlife, and water 
recreation,38 unless allowing lower water quality is necessary to accommodate important 
economic or social development.  Even then, water quality standards must fully protect 
existing uses.  In addition, the state must assure achievement of the highest statutory and 
regulatory requirements for all point sources and all cost-effective and reasonable best 
management practices for nonpoint sources.  Third, the state must maintain quality in 
high quality waters that constitute an “outstanding National resource,” including waters 
of national and state parks and wildlife refuges and waters of “exceptional recreational or 
ecological significance.”39  In short, the policy requires different levels of protection for 
three types of waters.  Under Tier 1, existing uses must be maintained in all waters.  
Under Tier 2, for high-quality waters that exceed fishable/swimmable quality, 
degradation of water quality will be allowed only if it is necessary to accommodate 
important social or economic development in the region.  Degradation of water quality is 
completely prohibited for Tier 3, Outstanding National Resource Waters.40 
 
The anti-degradation policy may affect states administering the Clean Water Act 
or discharging sources in several circumstances.  States must review and, if appropriate, 
revise their water quality standards at least once every three years.  Any such revisions 
                                                 
33 A total maximum daily load is the maximum aggregate pollution loading that the receiving water is 
capable of assimilating without violating applicable water quality standards by creating excessive pollutant 
concentrations or interfering with designated uses.  GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 627. 
34 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B) (2006). 
35 Jeffrey Gaba,  New Sources, New Growth and the Clean Water Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 651, 672 (2004) 
[hereinafter New Growth].  See also PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep’t of Ecology, 511 
U.S. 700, 718 (1994). 
36 PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 718-19 (1994). 
37 Id. at 705.  See also Qs & As, supra note 31, at 3 (stating that “no activity is allowable . . . which could 
partially or completely eliminate any existing use”). 
38 Aside from an unrealistic no discharge goal, the Clean Water Act’s primary goal is to achieve, wherever 
attainable, “water quality which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife 
and provides for recreation in and on the water . . . .”  33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (2006). 
39 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a). 
40 Kalisek, supra note 26, at 9. 
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must comply with the anti-degradation policy.   If a state issues a discharge permit for a 
point source which violates the antidegradation policy, EPA may veto the permit.41  EPA 
also may disapprove total maximum daily loads that violate the policy.  The Act requires 
those seeking a federal license or permit to conduct an activity which may result in a 
discharge (such as operation of a hydropower plant or the filling of waters) to provide the 
federal permitting authority with a certification that the discharge will comply with state 
water quality standards.   Without such a certification, the federal agency may not issue 
the license or permit.42  Activities covered by this certification requirement include 
discharges requiring a Clean Water Act permit in a state in which EPA, rather than a 
state, administers the permit program.43  If a state issues a certification for an EPA-issued 
discharge permit which fails to comply with the anti-degradation policy, EPA may add 
more stringent effluent limitations to ensure compliance with the policy.44  If a state fails 
to adopt an anti-degradation policy, EPA may adopt one for the state.45 
 
The Clean Water Act’s anti-degradation policy is not a precise set of instructions 
to EPA or the states.46  Its application has been described as “at best, obscure,” and as 
lacking in substantive content.47  One important question is whether the policy is 
designed to protect existing uses or existing water quality.  The answer seems to be both, 
but in different circumstances.  The Tier 1 provisions are directed at protection of 
existing uses, while the Tier 2 component aims to protect the quality of high quality 
waters.48  Tier 3 also focuses on protection of water quality. 
 
Another question is how to define degradation that violates the policy.  According 
to one critic, EPA’s regulations fail to recognize the relevance of that question.49  EPA 
apparently allows states to invoke Tier 2 protections when activities result in 
“significant” degradation” of water quality, invoking the agency’s inherent authority to 
                                                 
41 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (2006). 
42 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2006). 
43 Most states have received EPA approval to administer at least portions of the Clean Water Act’s National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit program.  EPA, State Program Status, 
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm.  
44 Qs & As, supra note 31, at 2. 
45 Id. at 1.  States may allow other activities to trigger anti-degradation review, such as non-point source 
pollution.  Kent Modesitt, Antidegradation: A Lost Cause or the Next Cause?, 2 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 
189, 193-94 (1999). 
46 Harleston, supra note 32, at, 52-53 (“In its almost thirty years of existence, few details of implementing 
antidegradation have been expressed.”). 
47 Jeffrey M. Gaba, Generally Illegal: NPDES General Permits Under the Clean Water Act, 31 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 409, 454 (2007) [hereinafter Gaba, General Permits].  See also Robert W. Adler, 
Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 
292 (1999) (“the current [CWA antidegradation] program . . . is so vague as to defy clear explanation”). 
48 Gaba, Federal Supervision, supra note 26, at 1192. 
49 Harleston, supra note 32, at 57. 
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avoid regulating de minimis environmental threats.50  State definitions of the point at 
which water quality impairment triggers anti-degradation review are inconsistent.51 
 
The policy is also less than clear in distinguishing among the three tiers of waters 
it covers.  It does not provide adequate guidance on how to distinguish Tier 1 and Tier 2 
waters.52  Likewise, the definition of Outstanding National Resource Waters is unclear.53  
EPA has left ONWR designation to state discretion, which some believe has provided 
inadequate protection to some of the nation’s most important aquatic resources.54 
 
Another flaw in the policy is its failure to describe when Tier 2 high-quality 
waters may be degraded “to accommodate important economic or social development.”55 
Absent constraints, this exception to the prohibition on degradation threatens to swallow 
the rule.56  According to EPA, the phrase seeks to convey “a general concept regarding 
what level of social and economic development could be used to justify a change in high 
quality waters.  Any more exact meaning will evolve through case-by-case application” 
by the state.57  The burden of demonstrating economic necessity “will be very high.”58 
 
According to one assessment, EPA’s proclivity for leaving the anti-degradation 
policy vague, and for affording broad implementation discretion to the states, has 
precluded the development of a consistent national anti-degradation policy.59  In addition 
to the resulting inconsistencies, troublesome gaps have developed, including exclusion of 
important pollution sources.  Montana, among other states, exempted nonpoint sources 
from the program.60  EPA once took the position that “[n]onpoint source activities are not 
exempt from the provisions of the antidegradation policy.”61  In this case, however, it 
approved Montana’s exemption, and a court approved.  Noting that EPA lacks the 
authority to regulate nonpoint source discharges, the court upheld as reasonable EPA’s 
determination that Montana properly exempted nonpoint source discharges from anti-
                                                 
50 Gaba, New Growth, supra note 35, at 677.  See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Horinko, 279 F. Supp. 2d 
732, 767-68 (S.D. W. Va. 2003).  See also Modesitt, supra note __, at 217 (noting that EPA regional office 
supported the use of a significance determination).     
51 See Modesitt, supra note 45, at 217 (noting that state approaches vary).   
52 Gaba, General Permits, supra note 47, at 454.  See also Gaba, New Growth, supra note 35, at 675 
(“Unfortunately, the difference between Tier 1 and Tier 2 waters may, in many cases, be more 
metaphysical than biological.”). 
53 John A. Chilson, Keeping Clean Waters Clean: Making the Clean Water Act’s Antidegradation Policy 
Work, 32 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 545, 553-55 (1999). 
54 Adler, supra note 47, at 287. 
55 See Katherine Zogas, Comment, The Clean Water Act’s Antidegradation Policy: Has It Been 
“Dumped”?, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 209, 229-30 (2008); Gaba, New Growth, supra note 35, at 686. 
56 Stitts, supra note 25, at 1359. 
57 Qs & As, supra note 31, at 8. 
58 Kalisek, supra note 26, at 12 (quoting EPA, Water Quality Standards Handbook, at § 4.5 (2d ed. 1993)). 
59 Harleston, supra note 32, at 77. 
60 Other states have taken the same approach.  See Douglas R. Williams, When Voluntary, Incentive-Based 
Controls Fail: Structuring a Regulatory Response to Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water Pollution, 9 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 21, 40 (2002).   
61 Qs & As, supra note 31, at 6. 
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degradation review.62  This left high-quality waters in rural areas unprotected from major 
sources of water pollution, a result arguably inconsistent with the Act’s goal of 
preserving and restoring the integrity of the nation’s waters.63  The court’s decision 
means there is no effective mandatory control over nonpoint source pollution affecting 
high-quality streams.  The anti-degradation policy also may fail to protect against 
cumulative effects of multiple discharges that impair existing water quality.64 
 
  2. Nondegradation and Air Pollution Control 
 
Before EPA’s creation, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) 
adopted nondegradation guidelines for air quality under the Air Quality Act of 1967.65  
That Act directed the states, subject to HEW’s approval, to adopt ambient air quality 
standards defining the maximum levels of pollution needed to maintain public health.66  
The guidelines stated that standards resulting in significant deterioration of air quality 
would conflict with the statutory purpose to “protect and enhance” air quality.67   
 
 When Congress adopted the Clean Air Act in 1970, it transferred responsibility to 
adopt air quality standards to EPA,68 leaving the states responsible for achieving the 
standards through state implementation plans (SIPs) that imposed enforceable emission 
limitations on individual sources.69  EPA insisted that it lacked the authority under the 
Act to adopt nondegradation rules.70  In Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus,71 an environmental 
group challenged EPA’s refusal to require SIPs to prevent degradation in existing clear 
air areas.  The district court ruled for the plaintiffs, reasoning that the statutory purpose 
“to protect and enhance” air quality to promote public health and welfare reflected 
Congress’ intent “to improve the quality of the nation’s air and to prevent deterioration of 
that air quality, no matter how presently pure that quality in some sections of the country 
happens to be.”72  EPA’s decision to allow the states to submit SIPs that lacked 
nondegradation protections was therefore invalid.  The decision was upheld on appeal. 
 
 In 1974, EPA issued regulations requiring states to conform their SIPs to a new 
PSD program to prevent significant deterioration of clean air resources.73   The 
regulations provided for three classes of areas with air cleaner than required by the 
                                                 
62 Am. Wildlands v. Browner, 260 F.3d 1192, 1198 (10th Cir. 2001).  
63 Blumm & Warnock, supra note 26, at 108-09. 
64 See Adler, supra note 47, at 285. 
65 Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485. 
66 GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 401. 
67Hines, supra note 21, at 660. 
68 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7409 (2006). 
69 Id. § 7410. 
70 Hines, supra note 21, at 663; Richard B. Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-
Constitutional Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from The Clean Air Act, 
62 IOWA L. REV. 713, 743 (1977) [hereinafter Stewart, Quasi-Constitutional Law].  
71 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd without opinion, 4 Env’t Rep. Cas. 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff’d by 
an equally divided court sub nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973). 
72 Id. at 255. 
73 39 Fed. Reg. 42509 (Dec. 5, 1974). 
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national ambient air quality standards for particulate matter and sulfur dioxide, and 
prescribed increments of allowable deterioration which were greatest in Class III areas 
and smallest in Class I areas.  In Class II areas, deterioration accompanying moderate 
growth would be considered insignificant.  Environmental groups, regulated sources, and 
some states challenged the regulations, but the court upheld them.74 
 
 Following judicial approval of EPA’s new PSD program, Congress amended the 
Clean Air Act in 1977 and codified the program, which remains in effect today.75  The 
statute requires every SIP to include emission limitations and other measures to prevent 
significant deterioration of air quality in areas with quality better than required by the 
national ambient air quality standards.  The statute requires that certain national parks and 
wilderness areas be designated as mandatory Class I areas.  All other PSD areas are 
designated as Class II, but the states may redesignate them to Class I or Class III (with 
some restrictions).  The statute specifies the permissible amount of deterioration of 
particulate matter and sulfur dioxide for all three classes, with the largest increments of 
deterioration applying to Class III areas and the smallest to Class I areas.76  The 
increments are calculated as percentages of the national ambient air quality standards.   
 
A permit program for stationary sources (called new source review) provides the 
main mechanism for protecting existing clean air resources.  No new or modified major 
emitting facility may be constructed in a PSD area unless it has received a permit from 
the state in which it is located.  A permit applicant must show that its emissions will not 
cause or contribute to significant deterioration of existing clean air resources by 
exceeding the applicable PSD increment or the national ambient air quality standards.77  
In addition, permit holders must use the best available pollution control technology, 
determined on a source-by-source basis, taking into account energy, environmental, and 
economic impacts.78  The PSD program thus seeks to force sources to cut emissions 
through improved pollution controls or changes in production processes.79  Unlike the 
Clean Water Act policy, the program creates “an antidegradation standard that is clear, 
precise, and objective with a narrow range of permissible interpretations.”80 
 
B. Anti-backsliding in U.S. Environmental Law 
                                                 
74 Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. granted sub nom. Montana Power Co. v. EPA, 
430 U.S. 953 (1977), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 959 (1977), vacated and remanded for reconsideration, 434 
U.S. 809 (1977). 
75 Craig N. Oren, Prevention of Significant Deterioration: Control-Compelling Versus Site-Shifting, 74 
IOWA L. REV. 1, 4 (1988) [hereinafter Control-Compelling]; Stewart, Quasi-Constitutional Law, supra note 
70, at 745.  For discussion of the PSD provisions, see Craig N. Oren, Clearing the Air: The McCubbins-
Noll-Weingast Hypothesis and the Clean Air Act, 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 45 (1989); John-Mark Stensvaag, 
Preventing Significant Deterioration under the Clean Air Act: Area Classification, Initial Allocation, and 
Redesignation,  41 ENVTL. L. REP. 10008 (2011). 
76 42 U.S.C. §§ 7471-7474 (2006). 
77 Id. § 7475(a)(1), (3); Oren, Control-Compelling, supra note 75, at 39-40. 
78 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a)(4), 7479(3) (2006). 
79 Oren, Control-Compelling, supra note 75, at 29. 
80 Stitts, supra note 25, at 1368. 
To be published as chapter in 
LE PRINCIPE DE NON-REGRÉSSION EN DROIT DE L’ENVIRONNEMENT 
(M. Prieur & G. Sozzo, eds.) 
 
   
 
11
 
Anti-backsliding differs from nondegradation.  Degradation involves changes in 
ambient quality, while backsliding relates to changes in permitted discharge limits.81  
Anti-backsliding restrictions preclude regulators from loosening control requirements on 
sources that have already proved capable of complying with more stringent controls. 
 
Environmental statutes are typically designed to improve environmental quality 
over time.  The Clean Water Act seeks to reach its ultimate goal of eliminating all point 
source discharges and its interim goal of fishable-swimmable water quality82 by requiring 
regulated sources to comply with increasingly stringent discharge controls.83  Likewise, a 
principal Clean Air Act goal is to “enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources,”84 
and the statute strives to improve air quality in nonattainment areas that have air quality 
worse than what is required to protect the public health and welfare.85  Yet, as one court 
has indicated, pollution controls do not invariably become more stringent.  “In some 
instances new restrictions are more lax than old ones covering equivalent effluents.  This 
raises the question of what happens when a permit holder asks, at the time of renewal or 
reissuance, to get the benefit of the new rule – to ‘backslide.’”86  Both water and air 
pollution laws in the U.S. limit backsliding. 
 
1. Anti-Backsliding and U.S. Water Pollution Control 
  
The Clean Water Act authorizes EPA to issue enforceable effluent limitations for 
classes of point sources based on the best available control technology for the class.87  
Because adopting regulations for all point source categories was a lengthy process, 
however, Congress authorized permit-issuing agencies to impose source-specific 
limitations determined on the basis of the exercise of the agency’s best professional 
judgment (BPJ).88  When EPA issued regulations containing category-wide effluent 
limitations that were less stringent than those found in BPJ permits for sources in that 
industry, the question became whether a permitting agency could amend the BPJ permit 
by substituting the less stringent regulatory limitation.89  For the most part, EPA said no. 
 
EPA adopted its first anti-backsliding rule in 1979.90  Congress codified EPA’s 
policy in the 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act at the same time as it endorsed 
EPA’s anti-degradation policy.  The Act generally prohibits EPA from allowing permit 
holders to backslide from BPJ-based discharge limitations or limitations imposed to 
                                                 
81 Mark C. Van Putten, The Dilution of the Clean Water Act, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 863, 895 (1986). 
82 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). 
83 Id. §§ 1311(b), 1314(b). 
84 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2006). 
85 Id. §§ 7501-7515. 
86 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
87 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b), 1314(b) (2006); E.I du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977). 
88 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1)(B) (2006). 
89 Van Putten, supra note 81, at 883. 
90 44 Fed. Reg. 32854 (1979); 33 C.F.R. § 122.15(i) (1986). 
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comply with state water quality standards.91   Backsliding is allowed if a discharger has 
been unable to meet the effluent limits in its permits despite installation and maintenance 
of the required control technology, facility alterations or additions justify a less stringent 
limitation, new information is available that would have justified a less stringent 
limitation, or events over which the permit holder has no control and for which no 
reasonable remedy is available justify backsliding.92  A reissued permit may never 
contain effluent limitations less stringent than the applicable regulatory limitations for 
that industry.  Backsliding is also forbidden if it could cause violation of a state water 
quality standard, including the anti-degradation policy.93  Thus, the anti-backsliding 
provisions supplement and support the anti-degradation program.94 
 
 2. Anti-Backsliding and U.S. Air Pollution Control 
 
The Clean Air Act also limits backsliding.  If EPA relaxes an ambient air quality 
standard, it must still require controls not less stringent than the controls applicable to 
areas designated nonattainment before the relaxation.95  Similarly, no control requirement 
in effect or required by a SIP that was in effect before the 1990 amendments in any 
nonattainment area may be modified “unless the modification insures equivalent or 
greater emission reductions” of the pollutant for which the area is nonattainment.96 
 
IV. NON-RIGHTS-BASED JUSTIFICATION FOR NONDEGRADATION DUTIES IN U.S. 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 
 Although nondegradation laws could be based on individual rights to a clean 
environment, neither Congress nor EPA has offered that rationale as the basis for 
adopting them.  Instead, the justifications advanced for nondegradation provisions 
include providing a margin of safety to offset the risk that regulations will not provide the 
desired level of protection, protecting special value natural resources, preventing the 
movement of industry to areas with superior environmental quality, preventing interstate 
pollution, and preserving opportunities for future economic growth.  Anti-backsliding 
provisions seek to force regulated sources to achieve the highest level of pollution control 
of which they are capable. 
 
A. Nondegradation and Non-Rights-Based Justifications 
                                                 
91 33 U.S.C. § 1342(o)(1) (2006).  EPA’s implementing regulations are at 40 C.F.R. § 122.44 (l)(2).  See 
generally Melissa A Thorne, Antibacksliding: Understanding One of the Most Misunderstood Provisions of 
the Clean Water Act,  31 Envtl. L. Rep. 10322 (2001).  For a slide presentation on the operation of the 
CWA’s anti-backsliding rules prepared by EPA, see http://www.crwp.org/pdf_files/antibacksliding.pdf. 
92 33 U.S.C. § 1342(o)(2) (2006). 
93 Id. § 1342(o)(3).  The statute also precludes backsliding in waters that do not yet comply with state water 
quality standards.  See id. § 1313 (d)(4)(A). 
94 Walter G. Wright, Jr., The Federal/Arkansas Water Pollution Control Programs: Past. Present, and 
Future, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 541, 624  n.508 (2001). 
95 42 U.S.C. § 7502(e) (2006). 
96 Id. § 7515.  See Casey Roberts, New York v. EPA: State Response to a Federal Regulatory Rollback, 33 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 613 (2006). 
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 1. Nondegradation to Provide a Margin of Safety 
 
The Clean Air and Water Acts both require the adoption of ambient quality 
standards to provide a minimally acceptable level of environmental quality.  The Air Act 
requires that EPA adopt primary standards that are requisite to protect the public health 
with an adequate margin of safety and secondary standards that protect the public welfare 
from known or anticipated adverse effects associated with air pollution.97  The Water Act 
requires states to adopt water quality standards that assure that pollutant concentrations 
will protect designated uses.98  Both sets of standards establish maximum permissible 
concentrations of pollutants in the air or water, expressed quantitatively or narratively. 
 
Environmental regulation often proceeds in the face of scientific uncertainty.  As 
a result, regulators may determine that a particular concentration level is sufficient to 
achieve the desired level of protection, only to discover later that adverse effects occur at 
lower pollution concentrations than once believed.  EPA has amended the national 
ambient air quality standards for pollutants such as lead and ozone by lowering the 
maximum permissible pollutant concentrations because the pre-existing standards were 
not as protective as the agency once believed or as the law requires. 
 
Nondegradation rules can protect against the risk that ambient standards are not as 
protective as the agency assumed when it adopted them; they can protect against 
misjudgments about the scope of environmental risk.  The Clean Air Act’s PSD program 
was adopted with this function, among others, in mind.  The program’s purposes include 
protecting public health “from any actual or potential adverse effect which in [EPA’s] 
judgment may reasonably be anticipated to occur from air pollution . . . notwithstanding 
attainment and maintenance of all national ambient air quality standards.”99 
 
Legislators in 1977 were wary of relying on the identification of harmless 
concentrations of air pollution and suspected that the only way to eliminate health risks 
would be to set ambient standards at zero.  Not willing to go that far, supporters of the 
PSD program sought to minimize risk by keeping pollutant concentrations lower than 
required by air quality standards in areas that already had clean air.100   The program 
would provide a “margin of safety” if pollution actually caused harm at concentrations 
lower than any threshold levels identified by EPA or if EPA refused for economic 
reasons to tighten the standards despite new evidence that existing standards were not 
sufficiently protective.101  PSD’s supporters also argued that the program was necessary 
because the national standards did not cover damaging pollutants such as sulfates that 
                                                 
97 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2006). 
98 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2006). 
99 42 U.S.C. § 7470(1) (2006). 
100 David P. Currie, Nondegradation and Visibility Under the Clean Air Act, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 77 
(1980). 
101 See Oren, Control-Compelling, supra note 75,  at 64. 
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cause acid rain and failed to account for the synergistic effects of multiple pollutants.102 
Accordingly, nondegradation requirements amount to an indirect attack on the adequacy 
of existing ambient quality standards.103 
 
 2. Nondegradation to Protect High-Value Natural Resources 
  
 A second function of nondegradation constraints is to protect highly valued 
natural resources that may be at risk from exposure to pollutant concentrations that are 
lower than those needed to protect public health.  Both the Clean Air and Water Act 
programs seek to promote that goal.  U.S. nondegradation policy can be viewed “as the 
pollution control analogue to wilderness protection in public lands management.”104  
While nondegradation policy in the pollution context is not as restrictive as constraints on 
use of wilderness areas under the Wilderness Act of 1964, nondegradation policy and 
wilderness protection reflect a common preservationist impulse. 
 
One of the purposes of the Clean Air Act’s PSD program is to preserve, protect, 
and enhance air quality in national parks, monuments, seashores, and wilderness areas, as 
well as other areas of “special” natural, recreational, scenic, or historic value.105  The Act 
provides for both primary, health-based air quality standards and secondary, welfare-
based standards.  Because adverse effects on welfare may occur at concentrations lower 
than those that trigger health risks, the secondary standards generally will be more 
stringent than the primary standards.106  Even then, secondary standards may not be 
adequate to protect particularly vulnerable resources, or EPA may have underestimated 
how clean the air needs to be to protect those resources.   
 
During congressional debate, supporters of the PSD program emphasized the 
benefits of protecting parks from air pollution, claiming that preservation of clean air 
quality would prevent damage that would occur even at pollution concentrations allowed  
by the national ambient air quality standards.107  Degradation of air quality in national 
parks and wilderness areas would interfere with scenic vistas in places like the Grand 
Canyon or damage unique natural resources, frustrating the opportunities for 
preservation, recreation, and spiritual renewal that justified creation of the national parks 
and other protected areas.108  The Clean Water Act’s anti-degradation policy serves the 
same function through its prohibition on water quality degradation in Outstanding 
National Resource Waters.  Enhanced protections are particularly critical if resource 
                                                 
102 Id. at 60, 82. 
103 Stewart, Quasi-Constitutional Law, supra note 70, at 742 n.144. 
104 Hines, supra note 21, at 645. 
105 42 U.S.C. § 7470(2).  See generally Craig N. Oren, The Protection of Parklands from Increased Air 
Pollution: A Look at Current Policy, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313 (1989) [hereinafter Oren, Parklands]. 
106 DAVID WOOLEY & ELIZABETH MORSS, CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, Appendix C (2011).  In practice, 
EPA rarely establishes separate secondary standards.  See GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 406. 
107 Oren, Parklands, supra note 105, at 329. 
108 Id. at 315, 346-47. 
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damage is expected to be irreversible or would interfere with the broader functioning of 
critical ecosystem services.109 
 
 3. Nondegradation to Prevent the Development of Pollution Havens 
 
Without a nondegradation policy, areas with relatively clean air or water quality 
would have a greater capacity to assimilate pollution without violating applicable 
ambient standards than would more polluted areas.  Under both the Clean Air and Water 
Acts, pollution control requirements tend to be most stringent in highly polluted areas 
that are in violation of ambient quality standards.  The Clean Air Act imposes rigorous 
controls on pollution sources in nonattainment areas,110 and the stringency of the controls 
tends to increase in relation to the degree of noncompliance.111  The Clean Water Act 
requires states whose waters are more polluted than state water quality standards allow to 
establish TMDLs that result in stringent aggregate effluent limitations for sources 
dumping into those impaired waters.112  Absent nondegradation programs, new industrial 
sources with choices about where to locate (putting other factors aside) would tend to 
choose areas with less stringent pollution controls to reduce costs of operation.113  The 
result would be not only degradation of existing good environmental quality, but also an 
exodus of business from industrialized areas with high levels of pollution to more remote, 
cleaner areas.  One would expect politicians representing industrialized areas to try to 
remove regulatory incentives that would likely result in a loss of jobs and tax revenues. 
 
Nondegradation provisions can prevent “pollution havens” by removing 
incentives that would drive industry to clean areas if they were allowed to deteriorate to 
minimal levels required by ambient standards.  They can prevent states in a federal 
system from selecting suboptimal environmental quality levels due to market failure.  A 
state would be unlikely to adopt pollution controls needed to prevent deterioration of 
good environmental quality even if the national interest would benefit from doing so 
because of a classic prisoner’s dilemma.  States with high air quality would bear most of 
the costs of maintaining it, while recouping only a small portion of the benefits.114  “Each 
state, fearing undercutting by a state competing for economic development, would be 
reluctant to adopt a potentially disabling policy absent some assurance about what other 
states intended to do.  All states would thus be paralyzed to act.”115 
 
                                                 
109 See, e.g., ROBERT W. ADLER, JESSICA C. LANDMAN & DIANE M. CAMERON, THE CLEAN WATER ACT: 20 
YEARS LATER 200 (1993) (noting that headwater tributaries of larger watersheds can “provide clean base 
flow and critical spawning and rearing habitat to support downstream flows”). 
110 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c) (2006) (listing requirements for SIPs that cover nonattainment areas). 
111 See, e.g., id. § 7511a. 
112 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2006). 
113 See Snyder, supra note 29, at  891-92. 
114 Stewart, Quasi-Constitutional Law, supra note 70, at 747. 
115 Hines, supra note 21, at 654.  See also Stewart, Quasi-Constitutional Law, supra note 70, at 747 (“In the 
absence of a nondegradation requirement, ‘clean’ states might compete with one another for new 
development . . .”). 
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These concerns motivated Congress to adopt the Clean Air Act’s PSD program, 
as it sought to neutralize the advantages that areas with superior air quality might have in 
attracting industry.  Some commentators attributed the passage of the PSD program in 
1977 to an effort by industrialized states to limit economic growth in the Sunbelt.116 
 
 4. Nondegradation to Prevent Interstate Pollution 
 
The PSD program sought to prevent activities in one state from harming other 
states in another way.  Some PSD supporters claimed that it would reduce interstate 
pollution from new sources, preventing areas from becoming “‘dumping grounds’ for the 
pollution caused by industrial sources in other regions.”117  The argument was apparently 
persuasive.  One of the goals of the program is “to assure that emissions from any sources 
in any State will not interfere with any portion of the applicable implementation program 
to prevent significant deterioration of air quality for any other State.”118 
 
5. Nondegradation to Preserve Economic Growth Opportunities 
 
A related justification is that a nondegradation program is a temporary device to 
postpone exploitation of good environmental quality until the potential for economic 
growth justifies the resulting degradation.  According to one expert on air pollution law, 
there is reason to believe that some PSD supporters held this view.119  This argument for 
postponing exploitation “draws from the conservationist, rather than the preservationist, 
roots of the environmental movement”120 in that the former supported governmental 
management of natural resource use to maximize economic return over time.121 
 
B. Anti-Backsliding and Non-Rights-Based Justifications 
 
Anti-backsliding provisions have a different justification, stemming, at least in 
large part, from the philosophy reflected in the technology-based standards that dominate 
U.S. pollution laws.  Technology-based regulation is designed to commit the nation and 
particular dischargers to “do the best they can” to reduce environmental harm “by 
requiring the most protection achievable by current technologies unless ‘costs are 
disruptive or extraordinary.’”122  Senator Birch Bayh explained that the Clean Water 
Act’s technology-based effluent limitations were designed to “force industry to do the 
best job it can do to clean up the nation’s water and to keep making progress without 
                                                 
116 Oren, Control-Compelling, supra note 70, at 105, 111. 
117 Id. at 85.   
118 42 U.S.C. § 7470(4) (2006). 
119 Oren, Control-Compelling, supra note 70, at  101. 
120 Id. (“[A] conservationist argument for maintaining clean air better than the air quality standards could 
hold that some restrictions on development now are necessary to assure that future exploitation 
opportunities are not sacrificed.”). 
121 See Hines, supra note 21, at 646. 
122 See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental 
Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1581 (2002) (“Simply put, the idea is that we should do the best we 
can to mitigate pollution we believe to be harmful.”) 
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incurring such massive costs that economic chaos would result.”123 This commitment is 
not rights-based.  As two prominent scholars have noted in the context of worker health 
and safety regulation, “[a]cknowledging that society cannot vest workers with an 
unqualified right to an absolutely safe workplace, one may rationally assert that workers 
do have a right to insist that employers ‘do the best they can’ to protect human health.”124 
 
Allowing backsliding to occur would be inconsistent with both polluters’ 
commitment to control discharges to the full extent of their technological capacities and 
with the statutory goals of enhancing environmental quality over time.125  A discharger 
that has exceeded compliance levels required by across-the-board regulations has 
demonstrated its technological and economic capabilities to meet the more stringent 
requirements.  The technology-based thrust of the statutes would be frustrated if controls 
for such a discharger were relaxed simply because EPA or a state agency determined that 
the industry as a whole was not capable of meeting the more stringent control levels.126  
Nevertheless, the “do the best you can” rationale does not dictate an absolute ban on 
backsliding.  When Congress decided to codify anti-backsliding requirements in the 
Clean Water Act in 1987, it chose to allow permit modifications when doing so will not 
compromise the overall commitment to requiring maximum feasible levels of control.  
These include cases in which previous permit requirements disproportionately burden a 
permittee,127 facility modifications justify less stringent controls, circumstances beyond 
the permit holder’s control make compliance impossible, information unavailable at the 
time of permit issuance indicates that compliance is impossible, or a mistake of fact or 
law has been discovered.128 
 
C. Balancing Environmental Protection and Economic Growth 
 
Nondegradation programs seek to balance protection of existing clean air and 
water quality and continued economic growth.  A goal of the Clean Air Act’s PSD 
program is to “insure that economic growth will occur in a manner consistent with the 
preservation of existing clean air resources.”129  The level of protection required depends 
on the classification of a particular PSD area.  With the exception of some national parks 
and other highly protected federal lands, all PSD areas begin as Class 2 areas which do 
not receive the highest level of protection.  States may redesignate PSD areas downward  
based on economic and social considerations, although the amount of permissible 
                                                 
123 Wendy E. Wagner, Stormy Regulation: The Problems that Result When Stormwater (and Other) 
Regulatory Problems Neglect to Account for Limitations in Scientific and Technical Information, 9 CHAP. 
L. REV. 191, 200 (2006). 
124 Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based 
Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729, 743-44. 
125 See Max Baumhefner, The Ozone Saga, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 557, 572 (2008). 
126 Van Putten, supra note 81, at 890-91. 
127 NRDC v. EPA, 859 F.2d 159, 201 n.101 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
128 Claudia Copeland, Comprehensive Clean Air and Clean Water Permits: Is the Glass Still Just Half 
Full?, 21 ENVTL. L. 2135, 2166-67 (1991). 
129 42 U.S.C. § 7470(3) (2006). 
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deterioration is limited even in Class areas.130  Under the Clean Water Act’s policy, 
degradation of Tier 2 waters is allowed if necessary to accommodate important social and 
economic development.  Under this approach, “nondegradation policy does not make 
existing resource quality an absolute minimum.”131  The result is “a flexible, site-specific 
consideration of the economic justifications and social need for water quality degradation 
in light of available alternatives and the significance of the predicted degradation.”132  
EPA’s failure to define important economic and social development has given states 
broad discretion to endorse degradation of Tier 2 waters, as long as existing uses are not 
prevented or state water quality standards otherwise violated.133 
 
Nondegradation policies, then, can be viewed as a way to achieve efficient 
resource allocation.  Degradation is allowed if the value of the economic development 
that causes it exceeds the resulting marginal decline in the value of the degraded 
resource.  Nondegradation advocates have even couched these programs as job creators, 
arguing that they create opportunities for new sources and accompanying jobs increases 
by requiring tighter source controls and low ambient concentrations in clean areas.134 
 
V. THE POTENTIAL FOR A RIGHTS-BASED NONDEGRADATION POLICY IN THE U.S. 
 
Although U.S. statutory protections against environmental degradation are not 
rights-based, several sources of law might provide a foundation for bolstering efforts to 
build a rights-based model in the U.S.  These include constitutional and common law.  At 
present, neither source provides strong support for rights-based nondegradation 
principles, but the potential for their evolution in that direction exists. 
 
A. Constitutional Theories 
 
Although rights-based arguments for nondegradation programs are not firmly 
rooted in constitutional principles, they can provide policy support for these programs.  
The present generation’s ethical duty to preserve natural resources from irreversible 
degradation for the benefit of future generations dates was endorsed by the U.S. 
conservation movement of the late 19th century.135  Nondegradation policy is rooted in 
the obligation to protect the interests of future generations.  As one early observer noted, 
“[w]hile the nondegradation principle does not rely solely on philosophical grounds for 
its justification, . . . the ethical force of the idea best explains the actions taken.”136 
 
By preserving a diversity of environments, nondegradation policy can also 
promote freedom of expression.  Pristine environments can spur spiritual revitalization, 
                                                 
130 See id. § 7474(b)(1)(A). 
131 Hines, supra note 21, at 645. 
132 Van Putten, supra note 81, at 899. 
133 ADLER ET AL., supra note 109, at 202. 
134 Oren, Control Compelling, supra note 70, at 97. 
135 Hines, supra, note 21, at 647. 
136 Id. at 649. 
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ease the pressures of urban life, and foster aesthetic, social, and political views that differ 
from those associated with urban life.137  Nondegradation policies “vindicate powerful 
interests in environmental diversity that can persuasively claim to transcend contingent 
judgments about economic efficiency or subjective value preferences, and that can secure 
basic values which are implicit in the first amendment.”138 
 
Rights-based justifications for nondegradation policies are not merely theoretical.  
Montana has constitutionalized protections against environmental degradation.  Its 
constitution lists the right to a clean environment as an “inalienable right,” providing: 
 
All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights.  They include the 
right to a clean and healthful environment and the rights of pursuing life’s basic 
necessities, enjoying and defending their lives and liberties, . . . and seeking their 
safety, health and happiness in all lawful ways.  In enjoying these rights, all 
persons recognize corresponding responsibilities.139 
 
The Montana constitution, endorsing intergenerational equity norms, also provides that 
“[t]he state and each person shall maintain and improve a clean and healthful 
environment in Montana for present and future generations.”140  It requires the legislature 
to “provide adequate remedies for the protection of the environmental life support system 
from degradation and provide adequate remedies to prevent unreasonable depletion and 
degradation of natural resources.”141  These rights are not absolute.  The constitution 
prohibits only “unreasonable” resource degradation.  Similarly, the state’s anti-
degradation statute permits degradation of high-quality waters by projects that will result 
in “important economic or social development.”142 
 
The Montana Supreme Court interpreted these provisions in a case in which a 
private company sought to operate an open-pit gold mine near the confluence of two 
rivers.143  The company requested permission to pump groundwater to help determine the 
long-term response to dewatering at the project.  The water contained arsenic.  In 
challenging the state’s approval, environmental groups sought to require the company to 
comply with statutory nondegradation requirements by blocking it from increasing  
arsenic concentrations in the high quality surface waters affected by the project.  They 
also asserted that a statutory waiver of these requirements for certain discharges of water 
approved by the state agency violated Article IX of the Montana Constitution. 
 
                                                 
137 Stewart, Quasi-Constitutional Law, supra note 70, at 750. 
138 Id. at 756.  Some support allowing states to provide levels of environmental quality below federally 
required levels to preserve a diversity of lifestyle opportunities  See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing 
Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 611 (1996) (disagreeing with this approach). 
139 MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
140 Id. art. IX, § 1(1). 
141 Id. art. IX, § 1(3). 
142 Montana’s nondegradation statute largely tracks EPA’s anti-degradation policy.  See MONTANA CODE 
ANN. § 75-5-303. 
143 Montana Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 296 Mont. 207, 988 P.2d 1236 (1999). 
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 The court held that “the right to a clean and healthful environment is a 
fundamental right because it is guaranteed” by Article II, § 3 of the constitution, and that 
any statute or rule infringing on that right is valid only if the state shows a compelling 
state interest and that its action is “closely tailored to effectuate that interest and is the 
least onerous path that can be taken to achieve the State’s objective.”144  The court 
concluded that the environmental provisions of the constitution were designed to be “both 
anticipatory and preventative.”145  The rights provided in Article IX, § 1(1) were linked to 
the legislature’s obligation in § 1(3) to provide adequate remedies for degradation.  The 
constitutional right to a clean environment and to be free from unreasonable degradation 
was implicated because the pumping would have added a known carcinogen to the 
environment in concentrations greater than those already present in the receiving water.  
To the extent the statute excluded activities from nondegradation requirements without 
regard to the nature or volume of the discharged substances, it violated the environmental 
rights guaranteed by Article II, § 3 and Article IX, § 1 of the state Constitution.146 
 
 No other state has endorsed a constitutional right to nondegradation to the extent 
that Montana has, and many states lack any constitutional protections for environmental 
quality.  Even in states with such provisions, the protections afforded to beneficiaries of 
protected resources, and the obligations imposed on public officials to prevent their 
impairment, are unlikely to be absolute.  Instead, they may be constrained by economic 
and social needs and values.147 
 
B. Common Law Theories 
 
 Another possible source of state law recognition of individual or group rights to 
protection against environmental degradation is state common law.  The public trust 
doctrine might provide a basis for arguing that a state must prevent degradation of good 
air or water quality to comply with its sovereign obligation to preserve natural resources 
it holds in trust for its citizens’ benefit.  The doctrine traditionally was limited to 
precluding a state’s divestiture of ownership of resources needed to assure public access 
to navigable waters for purposes such as navigation.148  Some states now conceive of the 
trust more broadly.149  A California court concluded that, although the doctrine evolved 
principally to insure public access to tidelands and navigable waters, it is not limited to 
those resources or that activity.150  In some states, the trust protects wildlife, although 
such expansions may be statutory.151  California courts, among others, also have made it 
                                                 
144 Id. at 225.  See also Cape-France Enter. v. Estate of Peed, 305 Mont. 513, 519, 29 P.3d 1011 (2001). 
145 Montana Envtl. Info. Ctr., 296 Mont. at 230. 
146 Id. at 231. 
147 See, e.g., Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86 (Pa. 1973). 
148 See, e.g., Illinois Cent. RR. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).   
149 See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.3d 419, 425, 658 P.2d 709 (1983)  
150 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, 166 Cal. App. 4th 1349, 1360 (Cal. App. 2008). 
151 Id. at 1361, 1364. 
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clear that the doctrine obliges as well as empowers,152 calling the doctrine “more than an 
affirmation of state power to use public property for public purposes.  It is is an 
affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the people’s common heritage” in water 
resources.153  In addition, judicial decisions in some states describe the public trust 
doctrine in terms that seem to require preservation of the resources it protects.154  The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, for example, concluded that the state has a duty “to prevent 
further pollution in its navigable waters.”155 Allowing resource degradation appears 
inconsistent with a mandate to preserve natural resources in their current condition. 
 
These kinds of broad characterizations of the scope and import of the public trust 
doctrine have been rejected by some courts.156  But even if a state conceives of the scope 
of the trust relatively broadly, no courts appear to have converted the general obligation 
to preserve natural resources covered by the trust into a duty to prevent degradation of 
clean air or water quality in specific contexts, or to have recognized an enforceable 
individual right of trust beneficiaries to preclude the state from engaging in or authorizing 
degradation caused by pollution.  Even some courts that have described the public trust 
doctrine broadly have acknowledged its limits, concluding that it requires a “delicate 
balancing” of conflicting environmental and other social and economic demands.157 
 
 Because the public trust doctrine is not static, it has the potential to become the 
source of a government duty to prevent degradation of trust resources due to pollution or 
other environmental injury.  One scholar has acknowledged that even in western states in 
which the public trust doctrine has been interpreted most expansively, the rights it 
protects “still remain focused on public uses of waters – not on the ecological and 
ecosystem services values of aquatic and other ecosystems.”158  Nevertheless, she and 
others have argued that the doctrine should (and perhaps has even begun to) provide 
“both a rhetorically resonant articulation of the larger public interests in intact and 
functional ecosystems and a means of imposing broad duties on governments to act for 
                                                 
152 Id. at 1366 (quoting Charles Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 269, 284 (1980)) (“The heart of the public trust doctrine . . . is that it imposes limits and obligations 
on government.”). 
153 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 33 Cal.3d 419, 441, 658 P.2d 709 (1983).  
See also Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.2d 7, 18, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) (stating that “[t]he active 
public trust duty of the state of Wisconsin in respect to navigable waters requires the state . . . to protect and 
preserve those waters for fishing, recreation, and scenic beauty”). 
154 See, e.g., City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 521, 606 P.2d 362 (1980) (concluding that 
the uses of the public trust include “the right to preserve the tidelands in their natural state as ecological 
units for scientific study”). 
155 Just, 56 Wis.2d at 16. 
156 See, e.g., Idaho Forest Indus., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Watershed Improvement Dist., 112 Idaho 512, 516, 
733 P.2d 733 (1987) (“There is no ‘pubic trust doctrine’ relating to land which is wholly independent or 
unconnected with such navigable waters”). 
157 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, 166 Cal. App. 4th 1349, 1370 (Cal. App. 2008). 
158 Robin Kundis Craig,  A Comparative Guide to Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, 
Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 81 (2010). 
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the long-term preservation of ecosystems and other environmental values.”159  One expert 
has argued that courts in jurisdictions that have not yet relied on the doctrine to protect 
the environment can and should develop it to protect resources based on standards and 
policy statements in federal and state environmental statutes and regulations.160 
 
 Another potentially viable common law basis for protection against degradation is 
state water law.  Under the doctrine of riparian rights, landowners whose property is 
adjacent to a watercourse are entitled to continued flow of the water in its natural state 
and a right to reasonable use.161  Some states have interpreted this doctrine to provide 
riparian owners a right to water in its unimpaired state.162  Further, as indicated above, 
although nuisance law is often purportedly based on utilitarian principles, some judicial 
decisions reflect rights-based protections against environmental degradation for private 
property owners and perhaps for the public at large. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 Federal regulatory programs in the U.S. restrict deterioration of existing 
environmental quality and limit backsliding by permit holders.  These programs are not 
based on any individual right to a given level of environmental quality.  Instead, they are 
supported by efforts to provide a margin of safety against miscalculations in identifying 
safe pollution levels, protect high-value natural resources, protect the economies of high-
polluting areas, limit interstate pollution, preserve opportunities for economic growth, 
and force polluters to achieve feasible levels of control.  State constitutional and common 
law provide a firmer footing for rights-based nondegradation principles, but these laws 
are not universally accepted and tend to be limited in scope.  Nondegradation in the U.S. 
is therefore more a matter of legislative and administrative policy than of enforceable 
individual rights.  That posture is not likely to change any time soon, notwithstanding 
limited state recognition of a constitutional duty to prevent degradation and the potential 
for an expanded public trust doctrine to accommodate efforts to forestall degradation of 
environmental quality. 
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